JTA- From a $17.5 Million Gap to $39 Million- Who Knew What, and When?

John Hawley

Sep 18, 2026

JTA at a Crossroads — Part 9

When we began our JTA at a Crossroads series, the Jacksonville Transportation Authority was confronting a projected $17.5 million budget gap. We asked whether fare increases could meaningfully address it, what Jacksonville should pay its next CEO, whether U2C and the Skyway still made sense, and what measurable objectives should be attached to JTA's next leadership contract.

By Part 8, all of those questions had converged into one larger question: Who actually holds JTA accountable?

Less than two months later, that question has become considerably more urgent.

On September 17, interim CEO Cleveland Ferguson III announced sweeping reductions intended to address what JTA now describes as a $39 million budget shortfall. JTA says current-year expenses are $178 million while projected revenues for the fiscal year beginning October 1 are $139 million.

Up to 194 positions could disappear. Weekday bus service will generally fall to Saturday-level frequencies. Skyway passenger operations are scheduled to pause November 2. NAVI operations are scheduled to stop at the end of December. JTA also plans to eliminate roughly $25 million in professional-services and other contracts.

Those aren't minor adjustments around the edges of a transportation budget.

They represent a significant retrenchment of the system.

And now a former JTA Board member says Jacksonville should be asking whether something much more serious happened inside the authority.

First, Let's Be Precise About the $39 Million

The $17.5 million figure we discussed earlier in this series and the new $39 million figure shouldn't simply be treated as the same deficit getting larger.

JTA's September 17 announcement describes the $39 million as the difference between $178 million in current-year expenses and $139 million in projected revenues for the coming fiscal year. JTA says its reductions are intended to bring spending down to a sustainable level.

There is, however, another number that deserves attention.

An August report from Jacksonville's Council Auditor projected JTA would finish the current fiscal year with a $31.8 million deficit. Six months into the fiscal year, the projected deficit had been only $2.25 million.

That is an extraordinary change within the same fiscal year.

And unlike a generic discussion about declining tax collections, the auditor's findings begin showing exactly where some of the problems developed.

The Council Auditor Had Already Identified Warning Signs

Jacksonville's Council Auditor wasn't discovering JTA's financial risks for the first time in September.

A quarterly report covering the first three months of the fiscal year warned that sales-tax and gas-tax collections might fail to meet JTA's budget assumptions. It also warned that salaries and wages could exceed budget, employee benefits could run higher than projected and spending associated with Connexion and Connexion Plus appeared significantly underbudgeted.

Those warnings are important in light of what happened next.

According to reporting on the August Council Auditor findings, JTA faced approximately $17.4 million in revenue shortfalls, including about $10.5 million from sales and gas taxes coming in below projections. Passenger-fare revenue was also about $1.8 million below budget, which auditors attributed to the six-month fare-reduction pilot.

But revenue was only one side of the problem.

Auditors also identified about $14.4 million in expenditures above budget. Among the findings was an $8.4 million problem involving Connexion because the service-provider contract hadn't been budgeted for the full year. Fringe-benefit expenses were also $7.4 million higher than budgeted because benefit costs had not been accurately budgeted, according to the report.

That distinction matters.

Declining sales-tax revenue is largely outside JTA's control.

Failing to budget an existing service contract for an entire year is a different kind of problem.

Understanding how much of JTA's current financial situation resulted from external revenue pressures and how much resulted from budgeting, spending or management decisions should now be one of the central questions facing Jacksonville.

Ferguson Says Cutting Isn't the Long-Term Answer

Ferguson isn't presenting the current reductions as a permanent solution.

Asked by Action News Jax whether cutting represents a long-term strategy, he said it does not and that JTA needs to structurally change how it budgets. He also rejected the characterization that JTA's situation resulted from mismanagement.

The cuts nevertheless are substantial.

JTA says 44 administrative positions will be eliminated, while as many as 150 operations employees could also lose their jobs. JTA currently has 846 employees, meaning the maximum reduction would represent more than one-fifth of its workforce.

These reductions follow previous layoffs and furloughs. The Daily Record reports JTA had already laid off 31 employees and furloughed 87 workers during the previous year.

The effects will also be visible to riders.

Bus Riders Will Feel the Financial Crisis

Beginning November 2, JTA plans to operate most weekday fixed-route bus service at Saturday-level frequencies.

The First Coast Flyer will retain 20-minute weekday service, while Routes 1, 3, 8, 10 and 19 will operate every 30 minutes. Seven routes currently running every 30 minutes will move to hourly service, while another 12 routes will remain hourly.

Connexion and Connexion Plus services for eligible disabled and transportation-disadvantaged customers are expected to remain unaffected by these latest service reductions.

That's an important reminder about what a transportation authority's financial problems eventually mean.

A budget deficit may begin on a spreadsheet.

Eventually, somebody waits longer for a bus.

Skyway Stops. NAVI Stops.

Two of Jacksonville's most visible Downtown transportation systems are also being paused.

JTA plans to suspend Skyway passenger operations November 2. Ferguson says that should save approximately $10 million annually.

NAVI is scheduled to stop operating at the end of December. The Daily Record reports JTA expects annual savings of about $5.84 million, while Ferguson put the monthly savings at roughly $487,000.

That development is particularly significant because NAVI is the first phase of JTA's much larger Ultimate Urban Circulator program.

JTA launched the approximately $65 million NAVI system in 2025. Meanwhile, $247 million in local-option gas-tax funding had been designated toward U2C development.

Now the first operational phase is being suspended while JTA considers whether some of the money intended for future capital projects could instead help stabilize the authority.

That is quite a reversal from the transportation strategy Jacksonville was discussing only a few years ago.

From Building the Future to Paying Today's Bills

Perhaps nothing illustrates JTA's changed financial position better than its discussion of the Local Option Gas Tax.

Jacksonville approved an additional six-cent gas tax in 2021, with substantial portions dedicated to transportation capital projects. JTA's share supports projects including U2C and the Emerald Trail.

Ferguson now says JTA is discussing whether the interlocal agreement governing those funds could be modified.

One potential use is particularly striking.

JTA wants to explore using some of those capital dollars to pay down a $40 million line of credit and help cover employee severance packages resulting from the current layoffs.

That would require negotiations with the City because the money currently is restricted to designated capital purposes. Mayor Donna Deegan's administration says any changes would need to be negotiated and that funding for the Emerald Trail must be protected.

The broader question is difficult to miss.

How did an authority planning hundreds of millions of dollars in future transportation projects reach the point where it is considering repurposing capital funding to reduce debt and pay severance?

Then Megan Hayward Entered the Conversation

The financial revelations took another turn when former JTA Board member Megan Hayward spoke publicly.

Hayward told Action News Jax that she raised concerns about spending, governance, oversight and U2C while serving on the Board but wasn't taken seriously. Mayor Deegan replaced Hayward on the Board in March 2025.

Hayward now argues that responsibility for JTA's problems extends beyond former CEO Nat Ford.

She alleges other officials knew about problems within JTA and failed to adequately respond. She also told Action News Jax that she believes state and federal authorities should conduct criminal investigations.

That is a serious allegation.

It is also important to be equally clear about what it is not.

Hayward calling for a criminal investigation doesn't establish that a crime occurred. Action News Jax reported that it contacted the State Attorney's Office about whether it would consider an investigation; at the time of publication, the outlet said it had not received a response.

The appropriate question at this stage isn't whether someone is guilty.

It's whether the allegations and the underlying financial record warrant further examination—and what documentary evidence can establish about who knew what.

The Mayor's Office Tells a Different Story

The Deegan administration strongly disputes Hayward's characterization.

The Mayor's Office said JTA's Board "was not previously aware of the dire nature of the agency's financial situation" and said the administration learned about the severity of the situation when the Board did.

Hayward disputes that directly.

Action News Jax also reported that the Mayor's Office characterized her allegations as false claims from a disgruntled former board member.

So Jacksonville is now being presented with competing accounts.

One says the severity of JTA's financial condition wasn't previously known.

The other says concerns had been raised much earlier and weren't adequately addressed.

Fortunately, determining what happened doesn't require accepting either characterization at face value.

There should be records.

Who Knew What—and When?

That may now be the most important question in this entire series.

When did JTA executives first project a significant FY2026 deficit?

When was the Board informed?

What financial reports did Board members receive?

When did management know Connexion had been underbudgeted?

When did management recognize employee benefit costs had been underestimated?

When did JTA know tax collections were materially below projections?

When were the Mayor's Office and City Council informed?

And what corrective actions were recommended at each stage?

These aren't questions about personalities or political allegiances.

They're questions that meeting minutes, financial reports, emails, budget documents, auditor reports and other public records should help answer.

There Is Already Evidence the Risks Were Visible

One thing we can establish now is that financial warning signs existed before September.

The Council Auditor's first-quarter review specifically warned that sales- and gas-tax revenues might miss JTA's assumptions. It warned about salary and benefit expenses. It identified apparent underbudgeting involving Connexion services.

That doesn't tell us exactly who inside JTA understood the full magnitude of the problem at that point.

But it demonstrates that some of the risks now contributing to the financial crisis weren't invisible.

And that creates a more focused question:

What happened after those warnings were issued?

July Looks Different From September

The timeline becomes even more interesting when compared with the public statements surrounding Ford's departure.

When Ford announced his resignation in July, he said JTA was "operationally strong and well-positioned for the future."

Less than three months later, JTA is preparing for potentially 194 layoffs, reduced weekday bus service, suspension of the Skyway, suspension of NAVI, roughly $25 million in contract reductions and discussions about redirecting gas-tax resources.

Those two snapshots are difficult to reconcile without more information.

It doesn't necessarily mean the earlier statement was knowingly inaccurate. Financial forecasts change, revenues change and incoming leadership can reach different conclusions about the same organization.

But the contrast deserves explanation.

What changed between July and September—and what conditions already existed when JTA was being described publicly as operationally strong?

Ferguson Wasn't an Outsider Walking Into JTA

There is another important wrinkle.

Ferguson didn't arrive in August from another transportation authority and discover JTA's books for the first time.

He joined JTA in 2015 and had served as Executive Vice President and Chief Administrative Officer for the previous three years before the Board unanimously selected him as interim CEO on August 27.

That makes his perspective particularly valuable.

He understands the organization from inside its previous leadership structure while now being responsible for correcting its financial direction.

It also raises legitimate questions about what senior management knew as the financial situation developed and how information moved upward through the organization and to the Board.

Those questions don't establish individual responsibility.

They establish the need for a timeline.

City Council Now Has a Larger Role

That timeline may soon receive considerably more scrutiny.

Council President Nick Howland says the Council's Financial Audit and Oversight Committee will review JTA projects supported by the Local Option Gas Tax with the goal of stabilizing the authority and examining transportation spending priorities.

The Council Auditor already has broad authority to examine the financial operations of Jacksonville's independent agencies. The office's stated responsibilities include continuously auditing those fiscal operations and evaluating whether accounting systems provide adequate information for management and budgetary decisions.

That could make Council's review important for reasons extending beyond U2C.

Jacksonville needs to understand not merely how to close the current gap, but how the gap developed.

Those are different assignments.

Cutting expenses can balance a budget.

It doesn't explain why the budget became unbalanced.

The $39 Million Question Is Really a Governance Question

Part 8 of this series asked who watches JTA.

Part 9 may be providing the first major test of that oversight system.

JTA management is taking action.

The Board has directed Ferguson to stabilize the authority.

The Council Auditor has identified financial problems.

City Council is preparing additional scrutiny.

The Mayor's Office says lessons need to be learned.

A former Board member says much deeper investigation is warranted.

The public now has to distinguish between documented facts, disputed accounts and allegations that haven't been established.

That's exactly why transparency matters.

Before Jacksonville Moves On, Build the Timeline

There will be understandable pressure to focus on what happens next.

Which routes survive? How many employees ultimately lose their jobs? What happens to U2C? Can gas-tax money be redirected? Who becomes the next CEO?

Those questions matter.

But Jacksonville shouldn't move so quickly toward fixing tomorrow that it fails to understand yesterday.

A comprehensive review could establish when each significant financial warning emerged, who received it, what management recommended, what the Board was told and what actions followed.

That doesn't require beginning with an assumption of wrongdoing.

It requires beginning with the records.

Because $39 Million Didn't Appear Overnight

That's ultimately what makes this latest chapter different from the previous eight.

The issue is no longer simply whether JTA should raise fares, reduce service, reconsider U2C or restructure executive compensation.

JTA is now eliminating jobs and contracts, reducing the transit service riders receive, suspending two Downtown transportation systems and exploring whether capital money can help address immediate financial obligations.

At the same time, Jacksonville is hearing sharply conflicting accounts about when the severity of the problem became known.

Those accounts shouldn't be resolved through competing press statements.

They should be resolved with documents, dates and numbers.

Who knew JTA was heading toward this financial position?

When did they know?

What did they do after they knew?

And if warning signs were missed, ignored or inadequately communicated, why?

Nine parts into JTA at a Crossroads, we've arrived at a question even more fundamental than who should become the authority's next CEO.

Before Jacksonville decides where JTA goes next, it needs a much clearer accounting of how JTA got here.

Related JTA reporting:

JTA at a Crossroads - Part 11