Seven months after Jacksonville's Downtown Investment Authority projected up to $224.72 million in potential completion-grant requests over several years, major development packages are already moving through the pipeline at a pace that raises a new question: Is Jacksonville approaching that scale much sooner than DIA expected?

In February, Downtown Investment Authority CEO Colin Tarbert gave City Council an unusually revealing look at what could be coming. Ten known Downtown projects representing roughly $1.14 billion in development could seek between $145.62 million and $224.72 million in completion grants. Four had already produced requests; others could emerge over the next several years. Tarbert cautioned that not every project would move forward or receive a grant. It was a forecast, not a spending commitment.

Seven months later, that forecast deserves another look. Gateway Jax is seeking nearly $59.4 million in incentives for Riverfront Plaza. Its Publix-anchored N7 development remains tied to an approximately $49.65 million package that City Council has pushed Gateway to restructure. Council has authorized negotiations for up to $35 million in City support for the Culinary Institute of America's proposed Downtown campus. Hotel Merrydelle has generated another public-financing proposal, while other developments identified in Tarbert's February pipeline continue advancing.

These aren't all the same kind of public assistance. Some are cash completion grants, some are REV grants that rebate a portion of future incremental property-tax revenue, and others involve appropriations or loans. Count everything. Categorize everything. Conflate nothing. When Jacksonville does that, however, an important trend emerges: the broader amount of development assistance being approved, recommended, negotiated or seriously considered in 2026 is already approaching the scale of the multiyear completion-grant forecast DIA presented only months ago. And 2026 isn't over.

DIA's $224.72 Million Forecast Is Starting to Look Different

Tarbert's February list included Gateway's Publix-anchored N7 project, the Baptist Health Southbank hotel, the possible Project Revival development, Laura Street Trio, redevelopment of the former JEA headquarters, Independent Life and Hotel Merrydelle. Potential completion-grant requests ranged from $145.62 million to $224.72 million, with Project Revival alone estimated at $37.5 million to $75 million, the former JEA headquarters at up to $19 million and Independent Life at $20.27 million.

Tarbert fairly cautioned that some projects might never reach the incentive stage. But the opposite can happen, too. Projects can advance faster than expected, financing structures can change and developments not included in the original projection can emerge. Riverfront Plaza illustrates that problem: its proposed package approaches $59.4 million, including a $20 million completion grant and nearly $39.4 million REV grant on a $271.5 million project. It wasn't part of the February completion-grant forecast.

N7 adds another approximately $49.65 million to the current discussion, although Council hasn't approved the package and is pressing Gateway to reduce its reliance on a $28.25 million cash completion grant. The Culinary Institute adds potential City support of up to $35 million, although a final development agreement hasn't been approved. Those three matters alone represent roughly $144 million in public assistance currently proposed, recommended or authorized for negotiation.

That isn't $144 million already spent, and it isn't $144 million of identical taxpayer exposure. But neither is it a distant hypothetical. Jacksonville is dealing with those projects now. Add Hotel Merrydelle, smaller 2026 incentives and projects still advancing through DIA's known pipeline, and $200 million becomes a legitimate question for 2026 rather than a conclusion about what Jacksonville has already committed.

Colin Tarbert Predicted the Pipeline. Now He Owns the Forecast.

Tarbert didn't create Jacksonville's Downtown incentive strategy. He inherited long-term agreements, existing developers and projects negotiated across multiple administrations. But by February 2026, roughly six months into his tenure as DIA CEO, he had enough information to give Council a specific assessment of what was coming. More importantly, he articulated a standard by which his strategy can be measured: DIA wants to eliminate completion grants as soon as the Downtown market can sustain development without them.

The theory is straightforward. Public assistance helps close early financing gaps. Successful projects establish the market and reduce investment risk. Lower risk attracts cheaper private capital, which should reduce the public subsidy required by subsequent projects. Tarbert has acknowledged that Downtown isn't there yet, but he has also said reducing dependence on completion grants is the goal.

Jacksonville can now begin testing that theory against the numbers. If public investment is successfully establishing a functioning private market, the financing gap should eventually shrink. If successive projects require equal or greater public assistance, DIA should explain why. And if projects expected to emerge over several years are advancing much sooner, DIA should update its forecast.

If the Strategy Is Working, When Does the Next Project Need Less?

Gateway provides the clearest case study. Jacksonville approved approximately $98.58 million in REV and completion grants in 2024 for its first Pearl Square projects. N7 could add another $49.65 million package. Riverfront Plaza could add nearly $59.4 million. Hotel Merrydelle has generated another financing proposal, and Gateway envisions a much larger Downtown portfolio.

None of that establishes that Jacksonville made a bad investment in Gateway. Gateway argues that its projects reinforce one another: residents support retail, a grocery store makes residential development more attractive, additional activity increases surrounding values, and greater density strengthens the Downtown market. That's also the economic rationale behind public participation.

But the argument creates its own test. If each publicly assisted project makes the surrounding market more viable, when does the next project require less assistance rather than more? That's not an accusation against Gateway. It's a question about whether Jacksonville's incentive strategy is producing the market transformation DIA says should eventually reduce the need for subsidies.

Amendment 3 Raises the Stakes

Jacksonville is considering this new generation of assistance while preparing for a potentially significant change in its property-tax base. City officials estimate Amendment 3 could eventually reduce Jacksonville property-tax revenue by roughly $300 million annually, and Council members have already connected that possibility to the City's ability to continue funding large Downtown completion grants.

That doesn't establish that DIA or developers are rushing projects ahead of the November vote. Developers operate according to financing, construction, tenant and investment schedules of their own. There is no evidence at this point proving Amendment 3 is accelerating DIA's pipeline. But the timing makes the question legitimate: Has the possibility of substantially lower future property-tax revenue changed DIA's assumptions about the pace, structure or affordability of future incentives?

The fiscal uncertainty creates competing arguments. Jacksonville could become more cautious about making long-term commitments when future revenues are uncertain. Or it could conclude that creating new taxable Downtown value becomes even more important if residential property-tax revenue falls. Either position can be defended. What taxpayers need to know is which strategy DIA is following—and whether its February assumptions still reflect the pipeline it is managing today.

Jacksonville City Government Knows the Projected Returns. What Were the Actual Returns?

DIA doesn't recommend these investments without financial analysis. Its project documents regularly calculate projected tax revenue, private investment and benefit-cost or return ratios. Those projections matter because they help establish whether taxpayers can reasonably expect to benefit from an incentive package.

But projected ROI answers only half the question. What happened after Jacksonville made the investment?

Jacksonville has approved hundreds of millions of dollars in Downtown incentives across multiple administrations, while some REV agreements continue rebating portions of incremental property taxes for decades. Yet taxpayers don't have an equally visible scorecard showing what Jacksonville projected, what it ultimately paid or rebated, what each development actually generated and whether the projected public return materialized.

A projected 3-to-1 return isn't the same as a demonstrated 3-to-1 return. A projected 1.8-to-1 ratio doesn't establish that taxpayers ultimately received $1.80 for every public dollar invested. And where DIA models contain multiple assumptions or scenarios, another question arises: Which scenario produced the ROI number ultimately presented to taxpayers?

That doesn't establish Jacksonville is losing money on Downtown development. It establishes that the public cannot readily determine whether it is winning or losing. The Development Divide will examine that question separately, comparing projected returns with measurable results from mature incentive agreements.

A Projected Return Can Justify an Investment. Only an Actual Return Can Validate It.

If earlier incentives generated the taxable value, investment and public returns DIA projected, that evidence would strengthen the case for continuing a successful strategy. If actual performance fell materially short, Jacksonville should understand why before repeating the same assumptions. Either result is valuable. The purpose shouldn't be to prove incentives work or prove they fail. It should be to find out.

That becomes especially important when Jacksonville is simultaneously warning that it may soon have fewer property-tax dollars available for public safety, infrastructure, parks and other services. Opponents of Amendment 3 argue Jacksonville cannot afford to surrender hundreds of millions of dollars in future property-tax revenue. Perhaps they're right. But that argument makes another question more important: If every future property-tax dollar matters, how effectively has Jacksonville invested the property-tax revenue it already chose to rebate or commit to private development?

Jacksonville's $225 Million Question Is No Longer Years Away

Tarbert's most important February number may ultimately be the timeline attached to it. DIA told policymakers to prepare for a potential wave of completion-grant requests extending over several years. Seven months later, Jacksonville is already confronting another wave of major development packages while earlier obligations remain payable and additional projects continue advancing.

The broader total could conceivably cross $200 million in development assistance approved, recommended, negotiated or seriously considered during 2026 if additional known projects advance before year's end. It hasn't happened yet. But the possibility is no longer remote.

That doesn't necessarily make Tarbert's February forecast wrong. It makes it old.

DIA should update it.

And Jacksonville should judge Tarbert's strategy by the standard he effectively established himself: Does each generation of public investment make the next generation of Downtown development less dependent on taxpayers?

If the answer is yes, DIA should be able to demonstrate it. If the answer is no, taxpayers deserve to understand why.

Before Jacksonville city government commits the next $100 million, it should know what happened to the hundreds of millions it already put to work.

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