Jacksonville Housing Authority CEO Cheron Corbett Waller proposed giving herself 12% of developer fees received by the agency, plus additional compensation for senior leadership. The board rejected the draft on October 19, according to Action News Jax. The proposal raises a public-interest question: when a housing authority earns development revenue, how much should reward executives and how much should remain available for its housing mission?

Jacksonville has already seen a transaction-linked executive incentive become the center of a federal corruption case at JEA. Other housing authorities have faced convictions involving contractor kickbacks and audit criticism over project-related bonuses. Those histories explain why compensation formulas deserve close scrutiny; they do not establish wrongdoing by Waller, whose proposal was publicly presented and rejected.

JEA’s Aaron Zahn Case Shows Why Executive Incentives Require Independent Scrutiny

Former JEA CEO Aaron Zahn was convicted in 2024 of conspiracy and wire fraud and sentenced to four years in federal prison. The Justice Department said his Performance Unit Plan contained hidden features designed to produce enormous executive bonuses if Jacksonville’s municipal utility was sold. Prosecutors described a potential $315 million bonus pool, with Zahn expecting approximately $40 million personally. The Council Auditor’s examination exposed the plan’s consequences before the proposed sale proceeded.

The distinction is essential: Zahn’s case involved deception and a scheme to divert public money, rather than the mere existence of incentive compensation. Waller’s proposal came before JHA’s board for consideration, and the board voted it down. No evidence reviewed for this article establishes that her proposal involved fraud, bribery or a kickback. The common oversight question is whether an executive’s personal financial incentives align with the institution’s public responsibilities.

September 2026 reporting said Zahn had moved from prison to a halfway house and that his criminal appeal remained pending. A separate September arbitration decision found that JEA could owe damages over its handling of his employment agreement. That employment-contract dispute did not overturn his criminal convictions. The parallel proceedings illustrate why public boards need both rigorous financial oversight and careful contract administration.

Housing-Authority Corruption Has Diverted Money From Residents

The risk extends beyond utilities. In May 2024, former South Bend Housing Authority executive director Tonya Robinson received a nine-year federal prison sentence and was ordered to pay approximately $3.24 million in restitution. According to the Justice Department, contractors received housing-authority checks for work that had not occurred, then returned portions of the payments in cash to conspirators. Fraudulent documents helped conceal the scheme.

That was a criminal kickback arrangement, not an approved developer-fee incentive. It nevertheless demonstrates the damage when people entrusted with housing money turn agency transactions into personal income through fraud. Comparing such cases responsibly requires identifying the conduct that made them criminal, rather than treating every executive bonus as corruption. For JHA, the immediate issue is the justification and safeguards for the rejected compensation proposal.

What Waller Proposed and What the Public Still Needs to See

Action News Jax reported Waller’s base salary as $300,000 and said her proposal reserved 12% of developer fees for the CEO. Waller said the payments would not use federal funds and defended compensation based on professional expertise. The report also described an additional allocation for senior leadership. The full draft is needed to establish the combined share, payment triggers and any limits.

The news report’s numerical example also needs clarification. It describes a $2 million fee, $1.6 million going to the authority and a $240,000 CEO payment. Twelve percent of $2 million is $240,000, while 12% of $1.6 million is $192,000. The proposal’s actual language must establish which amount formed the calculation base before either figure is presented as the definitive payout.

An independent review should also determine whether incentives applied to projects begun before Waller arrived, whether payment required completed housing rather than a financing milestone, and whether compensation was capped per project and annually. Another question is what JHA would retain after reimbursing development expenses and meeting its obligations. A percentage alone does not answer whether a compensation plan advances the agency’s mission.

Who Hired Waller? How Jacksonville Housing Board Appointments Work

Jacksonville’s appointment structure places responsibility at several levels. Under Section 51A.103 of the municipal code, the mayor appoints JHA’s seven commissioners subject to City Council confirmation. The authority employs its executive director and determines employees’ qualifications, duties and compensation. Commissioners therefore serve as the decision-makers responsible for hiring and supervising the CEO.

In practice, a mayoral nomination moves through Council’s confirmation process, including Rules Committee consideration and a full Council vote. An adopted 2025 resolution confirming Deegan’s appointment of Daniel Blanchard illustrates that route. Those appointment votes create accountability for who sits on the board, while the board retains responsibility for its employment decisions. A mayoral appointment to the board is a different action from the board’s selection of a CEO.

JHA’s board approved Waller’s contract on January 14, 2025, after its first-choice candidate withdrew. Contemporaneous coverage identified Board Chair Heather Horovitz as an advocate for her selection. Horovitz emphasized improving the agency’s performance and culture. The available hiring record establishes a board decision, rather than a direct appointment of Waller by Mayor Donna Deegan.

There is a documented connection to Deegan’s appointments. Commissioner Andrea Reyes, whom Deegan appointed, chaired the Human Resources Committee involved in selecting the new CEO. Reyes’s August 2025 resignation letter described that work and expressed confidence in Waller. That supports examining the role of a Deegan appointee in the selection process.

Waller’s Salary and Housing Experience Provide Context

Waller arrived with housing and corporate real-estate experience, including service at the Chicago Housing Authority and leadership of the DuPage and Kendall County housing authorities in Illinois. Her DePaul University biography also describes earlier Bank of America roles. By April 2025, News4JAX reported that she was officially serving as JHA’s CEO. Her local tenure is therefore approximately a year and a half.

Hiring coverage described her compensation as $290,000 in base pay plus $10,000 for medical coverage, totaling $300,000.

Other Housing Authorities Have Used Developer-Fee Incentives

Developer-fee-funded executive compensation has precedents. A 2018 report quoting Joliet Housing Authority CEO Michael Simelton’s approved contract described a $15,000 payment for each qualifying new affordable-housing or tax-credit development financed. Payments were due at closing from developer fees rather than HUD funds. That contract ran through December 2023; its present continuation and actual payouts have not been verified here.

Portland, Maine, offers a percentage-based comparison with a significant limitation. A February 2026 draft policy for Portland Housing Authority and its development corporation proposed 1% of net cash developer fees for the executive director, capped at $20,000 per project. The draft included performance, employment and financial-capacity requirements. Its presence in a board packet does not establish adoption or payment.

On an identical eligible fee base of $2 million, 12% would produce $240,000, compared with $20,000 under Portland’s proposed executive formula. The comparison illustrates the importance of rates and caps, although the underlying fee definitions must also match. The existence of incentives elsewhere does not, by itself, establish that JHA’s proposed percentage was customary or justified.

Nonfederal Funds Still Require Financial and Legal Safeguards

A 2019 HUD Inspector General audit of Palm Beach County Housing Authority examined bonuses associated with two projects and a refinancing. One cash-out refinancing funded $144,963 in bonuses to the former executive director and employees during a fiscal year with an operating loss. Auditors said that bonus payment did not violate a HUD regulation, but questioned whether it was prudent and served the authority’s financial interests. Separately, they identified $62,377 in unsupported excess executive compensation involving inadequately distinguished funding sources.

Florida’s bonus law adds another layer of review. Section 215.425 requires bonus schemes to use work-performance standards, describe the evaluation process, notify employees before the evaluation period and consider all employees for the bonus. A 2014 informal attorney-general opinion specifically questioned a housing-authority bonus provision absent strict adherence to those requirements. Determining how the law applies to JHA’s draft requires the proposal and its supporting legal analysis.

Teaching Income Is Disclosed; EPI’s Current Ownership Is Unresolved

Waller’s 2025 Form 1 financial disclosure, filed June 29, 2026, lists DePaul University as a primary income source and describes her work as an adjunct professor. It lists retirement interests associated with Empower and Fidelity. EPI does not appear among the disclosed income sources or assets. Her 2024 filing, submitted August 4, 2025, entered “N/A” in those categories.

The teaching income is disclosed; the unresolved question is whether JHA’s contract or applicable policy required outside-work approval and whether that approval exists. Form 1 generally requires private income sources above $2,500, while public salaries need not be listed. Business-client and asset disclosures have separate thresholds and conditions. These forms do not provide a complete accounting of someone’s finances.

Waller’s biography says she established EPI LLC and identifies Efficient Process Implementation LLC as its former name. Atlanta Housing’s FY2027 budget lists Efficient Process Implementation under consulting contract 2018-0107009, with a current term through July 16, 2027. However, that listing does not identify current ownership, establish that Waller personally worked on the contract, or document payments to her. Her LinkedIn profile shows an ended three-year EPI role.

The Atlanta contract is task-order-driven, with no financial obligation unless work is ordered. Its budget allocation covers multiple consulting vendors and cannot be attributed entirely to EPI. Current ownership records, contract assignments, task orders and invoices are needed before asserting that Waller continues operating or earning income from the business. The present evidence does not establish a financial-disclosure violation.

The Board’s Rejection Leaves a Transparency Test

JHA’s board rejected the proposed incentive, exercising its compensation oversight role. The next transparency test is whether the public can examine the draft, the calculation examples, any independent compensation study and the legal review. Those documents would allow residents to assess the proposal on its actual terms. They would also clarify whether the board rejected its size, its structure, its timing or the underlying concept.

Jacksonville’s experience with JEA makes independent scrutiny necessary, while proven housing-authority corruption elsewhere demonstrates what public money can lose when safeguards fail. Those histories should sharpen questions rather than substitute for evidence about JHA. The standard is straightforward: executive rewards should have a documented public purpose, measurable results, clear limits and independent approval.

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