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Trump’s Coattails Come With a Fuel Surcharge: Could National Headwinds Reshape Florida’s Elections?

John Hawley

Sep 18, 2026

Politics from Jacksonville to Washington

War, fuel prices, immigration disputes and declining approval ratings are testing President Donald Trump’s political influence. In Florida, the consequences may extend from Byron Donalds and Ashley Moody to Jacksonville progressive Angie Nixon.

President Donald Trump will not appear on Florida’s November ballot. Nevertheless, recent polling suggests that many voters may treat the midterm election as though his name were printed somewhere near the top.

That could create an unusual political arrangement for Republican candidates. Trump remains capable of providing endorsements, fundraising support, national attention and access to loyal primary voters. Those are real coattails—particularly inside Republican politics.

But coattails can work differently in a general election. When a president’s approval rating is in the 30s, the same connection that helps a candidate consolidate Republicans may motivate Democrats, independents and dissatisfied former supporters to vote against anyone closely identified with the administration.

In other words, Trump’s coattails have not disappeared. They may simply arrive with a fuel surcharge.

Recent Polls Put Trump’s Approval in the 30s

A national Fox News poll conducted Sept. 11–14 found that 39% of registered voters approved of Trump’s performance while 61% disapproved. Democrats led Republicans 51% to 44% on the congressional ballot, with the Democratic advantage widening to 54% to 43% among voters who said they were certain to participate.

The turnout measurements may be especially important. Fox found 64% of Democrats extremely interested in the election, compared with 53% of Republicans. Seventy-one percent of Democrats said they were certain to vote, compared with 65% of Republicans. Fox News

A July Pew Research Center survey produced an even lower presidential number: 34% approval and 64% disapproval. Pew found that 42% of registered voters viewed their congressional vote as a vote against Trump, while 22% viewed it as a vote for him. Another 35% said Trump would not be much of a factor. Pew Research Center

Those results do not establish that Republicans will lose nationally or in Florida. Polls measure a moment, different surveys use different electorates and midterm turnout is notoriously difficult to predict.

They do, however, support the possibility that Trump is currently a stronger source of motivation for opponents than supporters. That is the basic condition under which presidential coattails can become a down-ballot drag.

The Iran War Is No Longer Confined to Iran

The administration’s political problem is not simply that the war with Iran remains unresolved. The conflict is increasingly affecting oil infrastructure, shipping routes and neighboring countries.

Iran-backed Houthi forces have expanded attacks involving Saudi Arabia and areas near the Bab el-Mandeb shipping corridor. Damage to Saudi energy infrastructure and continued disruption around the Strait of Hormuz have increased uncertainty about oil supplies and transportation. Associated Press

By Sept. 18, Brent crude was trading at approximately $104 per barrel and West Texas Intermediate at about $103. Saudi Aramco had suspended some deliveries to European customers, while the repair schedule for a damaged Saudi pipeline remained uncertain. Reuters

That gives the conflict a wider geographic and political footprint. It is no longer only a debate over military strategy toward Tehran. It now encompasses Houthi operations, Saudi oil facilities and two of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints.

A separate Fox News poll found that 71% of voters believed the administration lacked a clear strategy for ending the conflict. Sixty percent said taking military action against Iran had been the wrong decision, and 47% said the conflict had made the United States less safe. Fox News

Yet only 4% identified Iran as the country’s most important issue, compared with 34% who selected the cost of living. That suggests the war’s greatest electoral effect may not come from foreign-policy debate. It may come from what happens when people stop at a gas station.

Foreign Policy Has Reached the Gas Pump

JPMorgan reported gasoline around $4.37 per gallon nationally and diesel near $6.31, while acknowledging that the duration and ultimate oil-market effect of the conflict had become unusually difficult to forecast. Reuters

Diesel matters beyond the price displayed beside the interstate. It powers trucks, agricultural equipment and much of the distribution system that moves food and consumer goods. Higher diesel costs can therefore travel through the economy in the form of freight charges and higher retail prices.

The Fox poll found 61% of voters considered gasoline prices a major problem, up from 48% two years earlier. Sixty-three percent said the Trump administration had made the economy worse—including one-quarter of Republicans.

This helps explain why a strong stock market may provide less political protection than administration supporters expect. The S&P 500 was up roughly 12% for the year as of Sept. 11 and remained close to its August record. Reuters

That is good news for investors and retirement accounts. But the stock market and the household budget are not the same institution. The Nasdaq rarely buys groceries, and the Dow does not have to fill a work truck twice a week.

Lower-Income Households Feel Fuel Inflation First

Higher-income households generally have more room to absorb gasoline increases. They may be able to work remotely, drive newer vehicles, combine trips or draw from savings without immediately reducing other spending.

Lower-income workers often have fewer choices. Their jobs are more likely to require appearing in person, and affordable housing may be located farther from employment centers. An increase at the pump therefore competes directly with groceries, medicine, rent and utility bills.

Research by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York found that households earning less than $40,000 reduced their actual gasoline consumption by approximately 7% following the price surge, yet still spent about 12% more on fuel. Households earning at least $125,000 reduced consumption by only about 1%. Associated Press

That is a significant political distinction. Affluent households may dislike higher gas prices. Lower-income households may have to reorganize their lives around them.

The overall American consumer has shown considerable resilience, and energy represents a relatively modest percentage of aggregate household spending. But national averages can obscure the people experiencing the greatest pressure. Reuters

A family that can absorb another $150 a month and a family that cannot are included in the same average. Only one of them may be choosing between gasoline and a utility bill.

Ukraine, Iran and the Problem of Unfinished Promises

Trump repeatedly said during the 2024 campaign that he could end Russia’s war in Ukraine rapidly, at times describing a 24-hour timetable. The war continues, and Congress recently considered additional sanctions against Russia. Associated Press

The United States has since become involved in a second major conflict with Iran.

Supporters can argue that circumstances changed, that Iran presented a threat requiring military action or that presidential candidates inevitably simplify difficult international negotiations. Opponents can argue that the administration moved from promising fewer wars to overseeing an expanding conflict with direct economic consequences.

Politically, the contrast is easily understood: Ukraine was not quickly resolved, Iran became a new war, and gasoline became more expensive.

That does not settle whether the military decisions were strategically justified. It does help explain why foreign policy, inflation and presidential credibility are becoming intertwined.

The $5,000 Dividend Adds Another Economic Question

Trump has proposed sending a $5,000 “dividend” to American adults if Republicans retain control of Congress. House Speaker Mike Johnson has acknowledged that the proposal would require congressional authorization.

Depending on eligibility rules, the program could cost more than $1 trillion. That would come while the federal government is already running an annual deficit approaching $1.8 trillion. Economists and some Republican candidates have raised concerns about feasibility and inflation, while supporters argue the payments would return money to taxpayers. Associated Press

A Reuters/Ipsos poll found 63% opposed the proposed payment, including 40% of Republicans. Reuters

The administration has also expanded Treasury buyback operations. Those transactions are sometimes mistaken for eliminating debt, but the Treasury describes them as tools for supporting market liquidity and managing government cash. Each dollar used in a buyback generally must be financed through other Treasury issuance; it is not a trillion-dollar sofa-cushion discovery. U.S. Treasury Department

Together, the dividend proposal, continued deficits and fuel-driven inflation give Republican candidates a complicated economic message. They must promise relief from high prices while explaining a proposal that could inject more than $1 trillion into an already inflation-sensitive economy.

Trump’s 2024 Coalition Is Showing Signs of Strain

Trump’s 2024 gains among Latino voters, Black men, younger voters and working-class households were politically consequential. It would be a mistake, however, to assume those voters permanently transferred their allegiance to every Republican candidate.

Pew’s July congressional survey found Hispanic registered voters preferring Democratic candidates 49% to 26%. Black voters favored Democrats 68% to 8%, while voters ages 18–29 favored Democrats 47% to 24%. Pew Research Center

Those numbers do not prove that Trump’s 2024 coalition has completely reversed. This is a midterm electorate, Trump is not personally on the ballot and substantial shares of voters remained undecided.

They do show that the coalition is movable. Latino and Black voters are not monolithic, and neither group can be reduced to one issue. But both contain large numbers of working- and lower-income households exposed to fuel, food, housing and healthcare costs.

A coalition assembled partly around economic dissatisfaction can move again when dissatisfaction remains—or when voters decide conditions have worsened.

Maria Elvira Salazar Offers a Warning From South Florida

Republican Rep. Maria Elvira Salazar recently took the unusual step of publicly criticizing parts of the administration’s immigration enforcement campaign.

Salazar, whose South Florida district is heavily Hispanic, said voters who supported Trump in 2024 feel betrayed by enforcement actions affecting long-term undocumented residents without criminal records. She cited data indicating that roughly half of approximately 50,000 people detained in July had no criminal record. CBS News Miami

Her position is more limited than opposition to immigration enforcement generally. Salazar supports border enforcement and deporting dangerous criminals while advocating legal status for some long-term residents. The Department of Homeland Security and conservative Republicans respond that unlawful entry or presence remains a violation and that the administration is carrying out the enforcement voters were promised.

Still, Salazar’s willingness to confront the administration is politically instructive. Trump won approximately 57% of the vote within the district’s current boundaries in 2024. If a Republican representing that constituency believes enforcement has endangered support among Hispanic voters, other candidates are likely examining the same numbers.

Salazar is not abandoning Trump. She is drawing a boundary around an issue on which unconditional alignment may have become politically expensive.

That is what distancing often looks like in practice—not a dramatic divorce, but a careful decision to keep separate checking accounts.

Midterm History Already Favors the Opposition Party

Presidential parties generally lose congressional seats in midterm elections. According to a Brookings Institution review, the president’s party lost House seats in 20 of the previous 22 midterms. Brookings Institution

That pattern is not a law. Republicans gained seats after Sept. 11 in 2002, and Democrats performed better than expected in 2022. Candidate quality, district boundaries, economic conditions and major events can override historical tendencies.

But history establishes the starting incline. Weak presidential approval, elevated prices and greater opposition-party enthusiasm make that incline steeper.

The practical question for Republican candidates is whether Trump provides enough money, organization and base turnout to offset the voters motivated to oppose him.

Florida’s Governor’s Race Tests the Value of a Trump Endorsement

Republican nominee Byron Donalds built his campaign with Trump’s endorsement and remains one of the president’s most recognizable Florida allies.

Donalds nevertheless appears aware that an endorsement alone will not carry a general election. After winning the Republican primary, he told reporters that Trump has the party’s strongest following but that a candidate cannot simply expect the president’s support to deliver victory. His general-election message has increasingly emphasized insurance, taxes, healthcare access and affordability. Associated Press

His Democratic opponent, former Republican congressman David Jolly, is running as a centrist Trump critic.

Recent polls disagree about the race. A polling aggregation updated Sept. 9 placed Donalds ahead 44.4% to 40.8%, while its newest listed survey—from Democratic-aligned Change Research—showed Jolly leading 47% to 44%. Pollsmax

Because the Change Research survey was sponsored by an advocacy organization and several previous polls showed Donalds ahead, it should not be treated as definitive evidence that Jolly leads. It does indicate that at least some polling finds the race competitive despite Florida’s substantial Republican registration advantage.

The governor’s contest may therefore measure whether Trump’s endorsement remains an asset beyond a Republican primary—and whether Donalds can establish a political identity broad enough to survive a difficult national environment.

Ashley Moody Has the Republican Structure—Angie Nixon Has the Energy

Florida’s Senate contest presents an even sharper contrast.

Republican Ashley Moody is an incumbent senator, a former attorney general and an established statewide candidate. She was appointed to replace Marco Rubio and has Trump’s endorsement. Her campaign prominently describes her as an “America First fighter.”

Democrat Angie Nixon is a Jacksonville state representative, community organizer and member of the Democratic Socialists of America. Her platform includes Medicare for All, a higher federal minimum wage, expanded child care and aggressive housing-cost policies.

Nixon defeated better-funded primary opponent Alex Vindman 56% to 44% despite being outspent by a striking margin. That result demonstrated the strength of her organizing network and the limitations of campaign money when it is not accompanied by equivalent enthusiasm. The Guardian

Her endorsements include Bernie Sanders, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Ilhan Omar, Elizabeth Warren, Maxwell Frost and other nationally prominent progressives. Endorsements do not mean every supporter agrees with every platform position, but they have increased Nixon’s national reach and fundraising potential.

A Sept. 17 St. Pete Polls survey conducted for Florida Politics placed Moody at 45.2% and Nixon at 44.8%, within the 3.2-point margin of error. Nixon led independents 50% to 37% in that survey. Another recent Change Research poll showed the candidates tied at 47%.

These are individual surveys, not proof that the race is tied. Moody retains the advantages of incumbency, statewide experience and a Florida Republican registration lead of approximately 1.5 million voters. Florida has not elected a Democratic U.S. senator since Bill Nelson’s 2012 reelection.

Still, the polling makes it difficult to dismiss Nixon’s candidacy solely because of her progressive ideology or limited initial resources.

Facebook Popularity Is Not a Poll—but It Can Reveal Intensity

A Sept. 18 public-page snapshot showed Moody with approximately 162,000 Facebook followers and Nixon with roughly 86,000.

Nixon’s audience is smaller, but her page has grown rapidly, and recent posts monitored by The 101 Report have frequently attracted conspicuous levels of reactions and sharing relative to the size of her following.

That may reflect volunteer energy and message intensity. It does not demonstrate that Nixon has more statewide support than Moody.

Facebook does not provide a standardized public measurement of how many people were shown each post. Paid distribution, algorithms, posting frequency and the emotional character of individual content all affect engagement. A person can also click “like” without becoming a likely voter—one of social media’s oldest constitutional traditions.

The proper conclusion is limited but meaningful: Nixon has developed an unusually energized online following for a candidate who began with lower statewide name recognition. Whether that enthusiasm translates into voter registration, fundraising and turnout remains the unanswered question.

Could Anti-Trump Voting Elect a Strong Progressive?

It is possible for an anti-presidential wave to benefit candidates whose ideology is more progressive than the electorate’s average position.

General elections are binary choices. A voter primarily motivated by opposition to Trump may vote for the Democratic nominee even if that voter disagrees with Medicare for All, a $25 minimum wage or other elements of Nixon’s program.

At the same time, Nixon’s progressive identity may mobilize younger voters, Black voters and previously disengaged Democrats who believe the party has been too cautious. Her primary victory suggests that message has a constituency.

But the same identity can create vulnerabilities. Republicans will portray Nixon as outside Florida’s ideological mainstream, particularly among Hispanic voters whose families associate socialist language with governments they fled. Some independents and moderate Democrats may share concerns about the cost or scope of her proposals.

The two effects can operate simultaneously: progressive politics can increase enthusiasm while narrowing persuasion opportunities.

Consequently, a Democratic wave would not automatically elect Nixon, and Nixon’s online momentum does not establish that a wave exists. But a national environment dominated by dissatisfaction with Trump could allow a strongly progressive nominee to compete in a race that would ordinarily favor a conventional Republican.

Northeast Florida Could Become an Important Test

Nixon’s Jacksonville base gives Northeast Florida an unusual role in a statewide Senate election.

Duval County contains large Black communities, younger voters, progressive organizers, suburban moderates, military families and traditionally Republican neighborhoods. It provides a useful cross-section of the coalitions both parties need.

For Nixon, the local challenge is converting familiarity and enthusiasm into participation—particularly among voters who skip midterms. For Moody, the challenge is holding traditional Republican voters while preventing Trump-related dissatisfaction from affecting the Senate choice.

The region can also help distinguish genuine organizing strength from social-media attention. Volunteer activity, small-dollar donations, voter registration and early-voting participation will be more informative than raw Facebook reactions.

A strong Nixon performance in Duval would not by itself produce a statewide victory. A weak performance in her political home would make the statewide path substantially harder.

Coattails, Anchors and an Election Still in Motion

Trump remains the dominant figure in Republican politics. His endorsement can clear primary fields, direct enormous sums of money and connect candidates to a loyal national base.

The emerging question is whether that power now functions differently in general elections.

Recent polls show Trump’s approval in the 30s, Democrats leading the congressional ballot and Democratic voters reporting greater enthusiasm. The Iran conflict has expanded, fuel prices have risen, the Ukraine war remains unresolved and immigration enforcement is producing criticism from a South Florida Republican.

Those conditions may weigh most heavily on candidates who made alignment with Trump central to their political identities. In Florida, Byron Donalds and Ashley Moody have embraced that connection more clearly than Republicans such as Salazar, who are beginning to establish visible points of disagreement.

None of this means Donalds, Moody or other MAGA-aligned Republicans will lose. Florida remains structurally favorable to Republicans, and both candidates possess substantial financial and organizational advantages.

It does mean the traditional assumption may need revision. Trump’s support is no longer simply a benefit that candidates receive without cost. It may be an asset in fundraising and base mobilization while operating as a liability among independents, dissatisfied working-class voters and an energized Democratic opposition.

And if that opposition becomes strong enough, the beneficiary may not always be a cautious centrist. It could be a Jacksonville progressive with a rapidly growing audience, national endorsements and a campaign that has already demonstrated that the candidate with the most money does not invariably have the most votes.

That is not a forecast. It is the question Florida’s 2026 election is now positioned to answer.

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